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Rish v. Simao, 132 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (Mar. 17, 2016)1 
TORTS 
Summary 
 The Nevada Supreme Court held that the District Court wrongly excluded evidence of 
low-impact defense when it required a biomechanical expert testify about the nature of the 
accident, erroneously interpreting Hallmark v. Eldgridge 2 Instead, Hallmark requires sufficient 
foundation for admission of testimony and evidence, specifically excluding a biomechanical 
expert’s testimony under NRS 50.275. The Court additionally held that the District Court erred 
when it ultimately struck the defendant’s answer for violations of the pretrial order precluding 
defendant from raising a minor or low impact defense.  
Background 
 Jenny Rish rear-ended William Simao on April 15, 2005 in stop-and-go traffic. Rish had 
passengers in her vehicle, Simao did not. Neither vehicle sustained significant damage and 
although ambulances were called to the scene, none involved in the accident went to the hospital. 
Simao later alleged painful head and neck injures, requiring continuing medical treatment. He 
brought suit against Rish to recover damages for his injuries while his wife, Cheryl, brought suit 
to recover for loss of consortium. 
 Before trial, the Simaos brought a motion in limine asking the District Court to prohibit 
any testimony that the accident was not significant enough to cause William’s injuries (the “low-
impact defense”). Citing Hallmark,3 Simao argued that because Rish failed to include a 
biomechanical expert’s testimony about whether the accident was low-impact or not, the defense 
was precluded. Rish opposed the motion, asserting that doctors are usually allowed to testify 
about injuries sustained during an accident. 
 The District Court agreed with Simao that Rish could not lay the foundation for a low 
impact defense without a biomechanical expert, therefore prohibiting Rish’s medical expert, Dr. 
Fish, and her other experts from testifying to that effect. The District Court additionally excluded 
photographs of the cars and invoices regarding property damages. 
 During opening statements, Rish’s attorney described the accident without objection. 
Included in his description were the following facts: all at the scene denied help from the 
paramedics, Rish’s car was operable and she drove it away, and no one claimed to lose 
consciousness. Rish’s attorney later faced objections, and was ultimately threatened with a 
progressive sanction order, when he asked Simao’s physician experts about Rish and her 
passengers or whether Simao was transported to the hospital by ambulance. 
                                                          
1  By Heather Caliguire 
2  124 Nev. 492, 500–02, 189 P.3d 646, 651–53 (2008). 
3  Id. at 496–97, 189 P.3d at 649. Simao also cited the following cases: Choat v. McDorman, 86 Nev. 332, 335, 468 
P.2d 354, 356 (1970), Levine v. Remolif, 80 Nev. 168, 171–72, 390 P.2d 718, 719–20 (1964). 
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The District Court ultimately decided that Rish violated the pretrial order denying the 
low-impact defense eight times. These violations included: (1) Rish’s attempt to play a 
videotaped deposition during opening statements, (2) four questions posed by Rish’s attorney to 
Simao and his experts asking what happened to Rish following the accident, (3) questions posed 
by Rish’s attorney to Simao about the traffic during the accident, and (4) Dr. Fish’s answers 
during either cross or redirect. Because of these violations, the District Court granted Simao’s 
motion to strike Rish’s answer, entering default against Rish and dismissing the jury. 
The District Court awarded damages after a prove-up hearing.4 The damages included the 
following: for William Simao, (1) $194,390.96 for past medical expenses; (2) $1,378,209 for 
past pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life; (3) $1,140,552 for future pain, suffering, and 
loss of enjoyment of life; to Cheryl Simao: $681,286 for loss of consortium; and attorney’s fees: 
$1,078,125; for a total of close to $4.5 million. Rish appealed. 
Discussion 
 On appeal, Rish challenged the District Court’s order of final sanctions striking her 
answer and entering a default. The question posed to the Nevada Supreme Court was whether it 
was erroneous to exclude the evidence of her low-impact defense as a matter of law. 
The district court erred in extending Hallmark to preclude all argument of a low-impact defense 
 While the trial court can broadly determine whether or not to admit or exclude evidence,5 
the higher court will overturn that decision when the district court abuses that discretion.6  
The District Court incorrectly relied on Hallmark when excluding evidence of a low-
impact defense. Hallmark held that because he failed to review important information when 
forming his opinion, a physician (who was also a mechanical engineer) could not testify whether 
an accident was too low-impact to cause injuries.7 Additionally, because the biomechanical 
engineer’s testimony was less science based and more supposition based, he was not a qualified 
expert under NRS 50.275.8 Finally, in Hallmark, the expert could not testify because testimony 
could not be tested and his theories and methods were not subject to peer review.9 What 
Hallmark requires is that all expert testimony have a sufficient foundation on which to base 
testimony.10 
A low-impact defense does not require testimony from a certified biomechanical engineer 
or other similar expert.11 Requiring testimony from this type of expert deprives juries of hearing 
about the accident and other injuries without an expert first explaining it. As it is up to the jury to 
                                                          
4  After hearing testimony from both sides about damages. 
5  NEV. REV. STAT. 48.035(1); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fitzgerald, Nev. 241, 243, 577 P.2d 1234, 1235 (1978). 
6  Land Res. Dev. V. Kaiser Aetna, 100 Nev. 29, 34, 676 P.2d 235, 238 (1984). 
7  Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 497, 502, 189 P.3d at 649, 649, 652, 654. 
8  Id. at 500–02, 189 P.3d at 651–53. 
9  Id.  
10  Id. at 504, 189 P.3d at 654. 
11  Id. at 503 – 04, 189 P.3d at 653 – 54; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993); 
City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir.), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 870 
(2014); Howard Entm’t, Inc. v. Kudrow, 146 Cal. Rptr. 3d 154, 170 (Ct. App. 2012). 
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determine which testimony is credible and how to weigh the evidence, not allowing it to hear this 
evidence is impermissible.12 Additionally, the jury decides causation and taking away its ability 
to make this determination is in error.13  
Medical doctors can explain injuries to the jury.14 Not only is this common practice in 
other jurisdictions, but Hallmark explained that the if the expert proffered by the defense, also a 
medical doctor, had either examined the plaintiff or reviewed her medical records, he could 
testify as a means of laying a proper causation foundation.15 Therefore, a medical doctor is 
allowed to testify about causation, so long as a proper foundation is also laid. 
The district court erred in striking the answer 
 Validity of sanctions are reviewed with heightened scrutiny16 and, even if the order is in 
error, the party under a sanction order must follow it unless the order is overturned or it ends.17 
Following the factors enumerated in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc.,18 the District Court 
issued a written order granting Simao’s motion to strike Rish’s answer. In finding that Rish 
violated the pretrial order eight times,19 the District Court granted the motion to strike, dismissed 
the jury and entered a default judgment for Simao and his wife. 
 However, for violations of an order in limine to rise to the level of attorney misconduct, 
“the order must be specific, the violation must be clear, and unfair prejudice must be shown.”20  
Specificity of the order 
 The pretrial order disallowed the low-impact defense, but, other than stopping Dr. Fish 
and other defense witnesses from testifying that Simao’s injuries were not caused by this 
collision, it was unclear. The definition of a low-impact defense is “describ[ing] [an] incident of 
‘low-impact,’” likening it to “common, everyday experiences.”21 The order here, however, 
disallows evidence of all facts happening at any time around the accident, including those before 
or after it. 
 The District Court inconsistently applied the order. Rish described the accident in her 
opening statement, sans objection, with later sustained objections to questions directed towards 
experts and statements from witnesses describing the accident and its aftermath. 
                                                          
12  See Banks v. Sunrise Hosp., 120 Nev. 822, 838, 102 P.3d 52, 63 (2004). 
13  Nehls v. Leonard, 97 Nev. 325, 328, 630 P.2d 258, 260 (1981); Barreth v. Reno Bus Lines, Inc., 77 Nev. 196, 
198, 360 P.2d 1037, 1038 (1961). 
14  See Mattek v. White, 695 So. 2d 942, 943 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Santos v. Nicolos, 879 N.Y.S.2d 701, 704 
(Sup. Ct. 2009); Straight v. Conroy (566 P.2d 1198, 1200 (Or. 1977).; Wilson v. Rivers, 593 S.E.2d 603, 605 (S.C. 
2004); John v. Im, 559 S.E. 2d 694, 697 (Va. 2002). 
15  Hallmark, 124 Nev. at 504, 189 P.3d at 654 (the expert at question did not examine the plaintiff, he only offered 
his opinion). 
16  See Foster v. Dingwall, 126 Nev. 56, 65, 227 P.3d 1042, 1048 (2010). 
17  Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320–21 (1967); see also Howat v. Kansas, 258 U.S. 181, 190 
(1922). 
18  106 Nev. 88, 93, 787 P.2d 777, 780 (1990). 
19  See discussion supra. 
20  BMW v. Roth, 127 Nev. 122, 126, 252 P.3d 649, 652 (2011). 
21  Roxanne Barton Conlin & Gregory S. Cusimano, Litigating Tort Cases § 53:22 (2014). 
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Clarity of the violation 
 At least two of the violations were witness statements made by defense witness Dr. Fish. 
One statement was made during cross-examination by Simao’s attorney and the other was made 
on redirect. Neither statement was directly caused by Rish’s attorney. The other instances 
violating the pretrial order did not explain the accident, just Rish’s injuries and the traffic that 
day. Those incidents were did not clearly violate the pretrial order. 
Unfair prejudice 
 Unfair prejudice follows when a violation occurs that an objection and admonition to the 
jury cannot eliminate.22 Here, the District Court provided no explanation for why jury 
instructions could not eliminate prejudice. 
 The District Court’s instructions were unclear on how Rish could show the jury whether 
or not Simao’s injuries were caused by the accident. They instructions also failed to explain how 
causation and proximate causation differ. However, those instructions could still clarify any 
possible misconduct. 
 While at least two of the violations rose to the level of a pretrial order violation, the 
questions were stricken by the District Court and left unanswered. Therefore, the violations were 
not misconduct rising to the level of case-ending sanctions. 
Conclusion 
 The order striking Rish’s answer is vacated and the case reversed and remanded for a 
new trial. The District Court erred requiring biomechanical expert testimony to lay the 
foundation for low-impact defense, and medical experts may testify as to injuries sustained in a 
low-impact defense. Although a party under a sanction order must follow it until overturned, 
here, the violations of the sanction order were insignificant enough that a case ending order 
striking Rish’s answer was unwarranted. 
                                                          
22  Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 17, 127 P.3d 970, 981 (2008). 
